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A R T I C L E

Taking Public Access to the
Law Seriously: The Problem
of Private Control Over the
Availability of Federal Standards
by Nina A. Mendelson

I

Nina A. Mendelson is the Joseph L. Sax Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.

n the 1930s, Harvard professor Erwin Griswold
famously complained about the enormous numbers of New Deal regulations that were obscurely
published on individual sheets or in “separate paper
pamphlets.”1 Finding these binding federal rules was difficult, leading to “chaos” and an “intolerable” situation.2
Congress responded, requiring that agencies publish all
rules in the Federal Register and in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR).3 Currently, recent federal public laws,
the entire U.S. Code, the Federal Register, and the CFR
are all freely available online as well as in governmental
depository libraries.4
But with respect to thousands of federal regulations, the
clock has been turned back—and worse. To save resources
and build on private expertise, federal agencies have incorporated privately drafted standards into numerous federal regulations, but only by “reference.” These standards
range widely. The CFR presently contains nearly 9,500
“incorporations by reference” of standards, often referred
to as “IBR” rules. Many IBR rules incorporate privately
This Article was adapted from Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control
Over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of
Private Standards, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 737 (2014). It has been
excerpted and updated with permission of Michigan Law Review
and Nina A. Mendelson. Please see the full article for footnotes and
sources.
1.	

Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 199, 294 (1934).
Griswold notes that the thousands of pages of “law” issued in one year were
“scattered among 5,991 press releases during this period.” Id. at 199. These
laws included hundreds of “industry” codes drafted under the auspices of
the National Industrial Recovery Act. See Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New
Deal, 62 Duke L.J. 1169, 1179 (2013).
2.	 Griswold, supra note 1, at 204, 205.
3.	 Note, The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations—A Reappraisal, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 439, 440-41 (1966).
4.	 E.g., Thomas, Library of Cong., http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Sept.
29, 2013) (access to legislative materials); Federal Digital System, U.S. Gov’t
Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys (last visited Sept. 29, 2013)
(providing decades of access to the CFR, Federal Register, and all statutes).
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drafted standards from so-called “standards development
organizations” or “SDOs,” organizations ranging from
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
to the American Petroleum Institute (API).5 Recent IBR
rules cover food additives, pipeline operation, and infant
product safety.6 Agency use of IBR rules is likely to grow.
Since the 1990s, both executive branch and congressional
policies have officially encouraged agency use of privately
drafted standards.
An individual who seeks access to this binding law generally cannot freely read it online or in a governmental
depository library as she can the U.S. Code or the rest of
the CFR. The SDOs generally claim copyright and reserve
the right to earn revenue by selling standards. Accordingly,
an individual typically must first locate the standard, either
on the SDO’s website or by contacting the SDO, and then
pay a significant SDO-set access fee. Otherwise she must
travel to Washington, D.C., to the Office of the Federal
Register’s (OFR) reading room.7
This law, under largely private control, is not formally
“secret,” but it is difficult to find and expensive. The incorporated standard for infant sling carriers is currently
priced at $51.608; incorporated pipeline safety standards
are roughly $150 per standard9; others can be far more
5.	
6.	

7.	
8.	

9.	

Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131, 150 (2013).
E.g. Pipeline Safety: Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments, 78 Fed. Reg. 49996-99
(Aug. 16, 2013) (noting 64 incorporated-by-reference standards, including safety, transport, and public notification); Food Additive Regulations:
Incorporation by Reference of the Food Chemicals Codex, 7th ed., 78 Fed.
Reg. 71457 (Nov. 29, 2013); Safety Standards for Infant Walkers and Infant
Swings, 78 Fed. Reg. 37706 (June 24, 2013).
Agencies also sometimes provide access in their reading rooms, typically in
Washington, D.C.
Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Sling Carriers, ASTM Int’l,
http://www.astm.org/DATABASE.CART/HISTORICAL/F2907-14A.
htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). Although ASTM maintains a “reading
room,” as of March 2015, the standard was inexplicably unavailable.
Emily Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, 63 U. Kan.
L. Rev. 279, 315 (2015).
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expensive. Others have discussed the difficult question
whether SDOs still possess a valid copyright in standards
that an agency incorporates by reference. More generally,
the IBR rule problem raises the question of what underlies
the intuition that law, in a democracy, needs to be readily,
publicly available.
Ready public access to the law is critical to provide notice
of obligations not only to regulated entities, but also to
consumers, neighbors, and other regulatory beneficiaries.
This concern has been incorporated into constitutional due
process doctrine.10 Access is also vital to ensure that federal agencies are meaningfully accountable to the public
for their decisions.11 Finally, expressive harm—a message
inconsistent with core democratic values—is likely to flow
from governmental adoption of regulatory law that is, in
contrast to American law in general, harder to find and
costly to access.
Fully considering why law needs to be public and how
public it needs to be strengthens the case for IBR reform,
whether administrative or legislative. It also limits the
range of acceptable reform measures. The Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) permits incorporations by reference into the Federal Register only when the incorporated
text is “reasonably available to the class of persons affected
thereby.”12 A clearer understanding of why law needs to
be readily, publicly available could inform judicial interpretations both of FOIA and of the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) public participation requirements.13
In 2013, the OFR, which FOIA tasks with approving
agency incorporations by reference, agreed to revise its
rule. In November 2014, the OFR issued a final rule14
that, unfortunately, missed an opportunity to significantly expand the public availability of the thousands of
IBR rules. But even if the OFR does not take on broader
reform, individual agencies also could change their incorporation practices.
Finally, assessing public access needs in the setting of
agency use of privately drafted IBR rules also sheds some
light on how we should think about the value of governmental transparency. The law must be sufficiently public, with
a meaningful level of free availability, to provide notice,
ensure that government is accountable for its decisions, and
to express a commitment to core democratic values.

I.

Incorporation by Reference of Private
Standards

A.

The Use and Costs of Privately Developed
Standards

In 1966, Congress included a provision in FOIA permitting
the director of the Federal Register to approve an agency’s
“incorporation by reference” of material published elsewhere into regulatory text without reprinting it in the Federal Register.15 The material must, however, be “reasonably
available to the class of persons affected thereby.”16 Beyond
this requirement, OFR regulations permit incorporation
by reference of a publication only if it “substantially reduces
the volume of material published in the Federal Register.”17
The publication must also consist of “published data, criteria, standards, specifications, techniques, illustrations, or
similar material.”18 Congress expected this material at least
to be available in libraries.19
In the mid-1990s, both Congress and the White House
directed agencies, where practicable, to utilize privately
developed standards rather than writing new “government-unique” standards. The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) issued Circular No. A-119 in 1982,
most recently revising it in 1998, directing agencies to
rely on voluntary standards, including industry standards
or consensus codes, rather than “government-unique
standards.”20 After the publication of the original version of this article, OMB announced proposed revisions
to Circular A-119, but the proposed revisions continue to
emphasize use of such standards.21
Some such standards have been drafted without anticipating agency incorporation.22 Others undoubtedly have
been written with the hope—or the plan—of incorporation into federal regulatory law.23 Circular No. A-119 contemplates that agencies may provide financial support to an
SDO to complete a standard.24 Agency officials may also
participate in SDO deliberations.25
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

10. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency
Policymaking, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 414 (2007).
11. E.g., Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 357, 389-404.
12. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) (2012).
13. See 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (2012) (Freedom of Information Act); 5 U.S.C. §553
(2012) (Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking requirements).
14. Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66267 (Nov. 7, 2014).
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21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) (2012).
Id.
1 C.F.R. §51.7(a)(3) (2013).
Id.
See Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 497, 519 (2013).
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular No. A-119 Revised: Federal
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities para. 1 (1998)
[hereinafter Circular No. A-119], available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/circulars_a119.
Request for Comments on a Proposed Revision of OMB Circular No.
A-119, 79 Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb. 11, 2014). Proposed revisions are available
at WhiteHouse.gov, Information Policy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg_infopoltech (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
E.g., Strauss, supra note 19, at 546.
Id. at 513.
Circular No. A-119, supra note 20, para. 7(b).
See Strauss, supra note 19, at 506.
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In developing policy favoring the use of private voluntary standards, neither Congress nor the original drafters
of OMB Circular No. A-119 appeared to anticipate that
SDOs would both claim copyrights in their incorporated
standards and charge access fees. In any event, current
agency practice is to incorporate standards even if SDOs
charge a significant price for access,26 and OFR’s rule
requires only that agencies “discuss” what was done to
provide public access to an incorporated rule. Meanwhile,
the amounts charged far exceed the “direct costs of search,
duplication, or review” that federal agencies may charge for
FOIA requests for internal agency documents.27 As numerous groups and citizens have recently written, the fees that
SDOs charge can be prohibitive, particularly for ordinary
citizens and small businesses subject to the standards.
In a positive development, some SDOs have begun to
create online reading rooms in which some IBR rules can
be freely viewed. But readers must waive rights or even
agree to indemnification and forum selection clauses to
view the rules. Meanwhile, access is erratic, and SDOs uniformly reserve the right to revoke that access at will. For
most citizens, travel to a Washington, D.C., reading room
is not a viable alternative.

B.

SDO Procedures

Private organizations that issue standards have widely variable processes, and federal law requires no particular procedures for the development of outside material that an agency
incorporates by reference.28 Circular No. A-119 does provide general criteria for the voluntary consensus standard
that it encourages agencies to adopt. A voluntary consensus
standard is one that comes from a “voluntary consensus
standards bod[y],” which generally has the attributes of
“[o]penness,” “[b]alance of interest,” “[d]ue process,” and
an “appeals process,” together with the goal of “[c]onsensus,” which means that the procedure must be designed to
yield “general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity,”
including a “process for attempting to resolve objections by
interested parties.”29 But these “voluntary consensus standards body” attributes are not actually required. Neither
statute nor OMB policy appears to constrain an agency
from incorporating a “nonconsensus standard”30 or even
includes a preference for a consensus standard.
As a practical matter, and notwithstanding Circular No.
A-119’s criteria, SDO processes vary widely. For example,
at the API, whose standards are incorporated close to 280
times in the CFR,31 standards development is undertaken
primarily by committee. While outsiders apparently may
26. Draft Circular A-119 devotes only a single cursory paragraph to public access
issues. See Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Proposed Revisions to the
Circular, 10 (Feb. 10, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/revisions-to-a-119-for-public-comments.
pdf.
27. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(A)(iv) (2012).
28. 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (2012).
29. Circular No. A-119, supra note 20, para. 4.
30. Id. at para. 6(g).
31. See Bremer, supra note 5, at 150.

8-2015

participate, the organization requires a company name for
application to participate, warns that travel is required,
and states that it is advisable to have “your management’s
support in order to facilitate effective participation.”32 At
ASTM International, the SDO that has supplied the most
incorporated standards to the federal government (close
to 900 standards, incorporated over 2,000 times in the
CFR 33), only members may participate in standards development; the lowest level of membership costs $75 per year.34
Further, although SDOs may strive to implement detailed
internal processes for standards development and drafting,
SDOs are not subject to the transparency requirements of
the APA or FOIA’s hearing or public comment requirements, because those statutes apply only to “agencies.”35
At best, then, full public access to SDO decisionmaking is limited, and even when such an organization’s process is formally open to participation, it is often difficult to
tell who participates in decisions. At worst, groups may be
unrepresentative and decisionmaking closed. SDOs have
been criticized as being dominated by regulated entities
and, in particular, by the largest of those entities.36 Further, perhaps obviously, SDOs are not bound by agency
authorizing statutes; thus, they are under no obligation to
prepare standards that meet statutory criteria.
Although federal agencies generally conduct noticeand-comment proceedings when incorporating a private
standard, and this federal rulemaking process is open to
the public at http://www.regulations.gov, this process is
unlikely to fill potential gaps in SDO processes. APA rulemaking requirements call for an agency to publish a proposed rule and provide an opportunity for public comment
before finalizing the rule.37 An agency will typically state in
a proposed rule that it plans to incorporate private material
by reference, and the revised OFR rule requires the agency
to summarize the material to be incorporated. Unfortunately, contrary to the practice with agency-drafted rules,
the text the agency plans to incorporate is generally not
included in the Federal Register. Instead, a putative public
commenter is generally referred to the SDO for the text of
the rule, subject to whatever restrictions the SDO imposes,
including an access fee. Further, unlike federal agencies,
private SDOs appear to be under no particular or consistent obligation to disclose the data underlying their standards to the public, undermining any meaningful public
right to comment.38
32. See Standards Committee Application, Am. Petroleum Inst., http://www.
api.org/publications-standards-and-statistics/standards-committee-application.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
33. See Bremer, supra note 5, at 150.
34. See Technical Committees, ASTM Int’l, http://www.astm.org/COMMIT/
newcommit.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
35. See 5 U.S.C. §551(a) (2012) (defining “agency”); id. §552 (applying information disclosure requirements to agencies); id. §553 (applying rulemaking
requirements to agencies).
36. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
534, 641-42 (2000).
37. 5 U.S.C. §553(b)-(c) (2012).
38. E.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d
Cir. 1977).
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Even after standards are incorporated, SDOs do not
seem bound to continue making incorporated standards
available at any price, even when they are referenced in
and compose a portion of federally binding law. In fact,
SDOs already have made some incorporated standards
unavailable, likely undermining or even eliminating
their enforceability.

II.

Does Law Need to Be Public?

The IBR situation runs afoul of a widely shared intuition—that law created by the federal government needs to
be meaningfully public. Public access issues around IBR
rules have been less of a focal point compared with public
access to a range of less broadly applicable, but more captivating, governmental decisions: say, wiretapping policy,
or whether drone strikes can be used abroad (or domestically) to target American citizens who are suspected terrorists. Meanwhile, proponents of IBR rules have suggested
that, despite the lack of access, agencies save significant
resources by using these rules, and some citizens may not
see them as terribly interesting or important because they
are “technical.”39 But these rules, which impact public
health, safety, and the environment, are among the most
far-reaching government actions. Meaningful public access
is thus vital.
Understanding the importance of public access to these
rules may matter immediately for several reasons. First, it
could matter for purposes of legal reform by Congress, the
executive branch, or the judiciary. Congress could simply
require meaningful free public availability of all materials
incorporated into federal rules, or it could expressly address
the copyright and public access issues in another way.
Fully assessing why law needs to be public could affect
executive reform decisions. The OFR could reform its IBR
rules, or the OMB could revise Circular No. A-119 to
emphasize public access.40 Meanwhile, individual agencies
could change their incorporation practices.
Further, IBR rules could face legal challenges under
the APA and FOIA. One could argue that agency utilization of material for which SDOs charge access fees violates
FOIA’s statutory requirement that incorporated materials
be “reasonably available to the class of persons affected.”41
Any reasonable sense of the words “persons affected”
would seem to encompass, depending on the subject area,
large groups of consumers, employees in hazardous workplaces, and neighbors of natural gas pipelines.42 For such
“affected” persons, the access fees charged may present a
barrier that is far from “reasonable.”
A court might also hear arguments that a federal rule
with incorporated private material for which access fees are
charged violates the APA. The APA requires that an “inter39. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 5, at 183.
40. Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 77 Fed. Reg. 19357
(Mar. 30, 2012).
41. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1).
42. E.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011).
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ested person[ ]” be able to comment on a proposed rule
and to petition to revise a final rule.43 Commenting and
petitioning are difficult, at best, when seeing the text of the
rule requires either travel or a significant fee.
Finally, a more thorough assessment of the importance
of ensuring meaningful access to federal rules is an opportunity to consider, more generally, why we need governmental transparency.

A.

Transparency and Notice

The text of IBR materials needs to be readily and publicly accessible to give notice to those who must conform
their conduct to the content of the standards. Regulated
entities need to be able to learn their obligations easily.44
Moreover, due process bars the imposition of sanctions
on someone who could not have received notice of her
obligations.45 Small businesses charged with compliance
have complained in comments filed with the OFR that
the prices charged by SDOs are too high for them to
apprise themselves of their obligations. SDOs can even
make standards effectively unavailable by no longer offering them for sale.
Further, for regulatory regimes where incorporated standards are used, those standards also affect indirect regulatory beneficiaries, both individuals and entities. Congress
enacts regulatory statutes specifically to guard wide swaths
of the public. These range from the Safe Drinking Water
Act and the Pipeline Safety Act to the Consumer Product Safety and Motor Vehicle Safety Acts.46 The public can
reasonably expect to benefit, including through helpful
agency action.
Regulatory beneficiaries need notice of the content of
regulatory standards because those standards can affect
their choices of which toys or infant swings to buy, where
to live, or whether to drink tap water. The content, not
just the existence, of regulatory standards is important; a
neighbor might view pipeline or drinking water standards,
even if complied with, as inadequately protective. She still
might choose to relocate or filter her water. If notice is to
be effective, meaningful public access to the law’s content
must be provided to anyone potentially affected, not just to
those who must comply.

B.

Accountability for Legislative and QuasiLegislative Actions

In addition to the need for notice to both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries, IBR rules also need to be
43. See 5 U.S.C. §553(c), (e); cf. United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568
F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1977).
44. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 291, 321 (2005).
45. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167-68
(2012) (refusing to defer to agency interpretation in view of “the principle
that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct
[a regulation] prohibits or requires’”).
46. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 10, at 415.
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readily and publicly available so that citizens can hold the
government accountable both for complying with the law
and for devising it, safeguarding against arbitrary conduct
or “capture.” A lack of ready public access undermines the
public’s ability to hold government accountable.
Consider the agency’s own decision whether to utilize
the SDO standard at all. Even the most public-interested
agency official47 is likely to be interested in the significant
resource savings from adoption of SDO rules, including
rules that represent less-than-perfect implementation of the
agency’s statutory commands.
Pragmatic political concerns, including reducing the
resistance of regulated entities, also may nudge an agency
to adopt a less-than-ideal SDO standard rather than draft
a “government-unique” standard. If regulated entities are
well-represented in Congress or in the White House as well
as in the relevant SDO, an agency also might expect fewer
hassles from political overseers.
Further, once an agency has developed a pattern of relying on privately generated standards, an agency may find
it even harder to modify or reject those standards, because
devising or locating replacement standards likely will be
costlier than if the agency had well-established regulatory
resources and staff of its own.48
Ensuring that the agency is accountable for wisely
choosing which IBR rules to adopt depends on meaningful public access to those rules. For agency rulemaking to
serve as any sort of useful safeguard against poor standards
when an agency elects to incorporate an SDO standard,
the SDO standard and supporting data has to be meaningfully available during rulemaking, to ensure the participation of regulatory beneficiaries and ordinary citizens.
Other mechanisms for holding agencies accountable for
their choice of IBR rules also depend on ready public access
to those rules. The public might wish to seek congressional oversight or new statutes that more specifically direct
agency action,49 to register disapproval through voting, or
to file a lawsuit seeking judicial review of the agency’s decision. Our current regime of limited public access to IBR
rules undermines all these accountability mechanisms.

C.

The Distinctive Burdens Imposed by Access
Prices for IBR Rules

One could say that IBR rule prices pale next to costs, like
legal fees, that can accompany lawsuits challenging agency
rules. But readers also need access to the text of rules to
inform compliance decisions, purchases, medical choices,
letters to Congress or comments to agencies, and voting.
These are not necessarily costly activities. Prices for IBR
rules accordingly represent a distinct obstacle. Moreover,
these access limitations are not random; they systemati47. Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J.
389, 399 (2003).
48. Id. at 410-11.
49. See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power,
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 Duke L.J. 1811, 1821 (2012).
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cally exclude people based on budgetary constraints. Consumers and neighbors are likely to have smaller budgets
relative to regulated manufacturers and pipeline operators.
Regulated entities typically have an advantage, compared
with the general public, in participating in policymaking,
including in obtaining expert and legal technical assistance
and in joining SDOs. Access costs may worsen this imbalance by keeping many consumers and neighbors from even
getting in the door.

D.

Expressive Harm Imposed by Access Fees

Having to pay a fee to read the law can obstruct individuals from learning their obligations, making informed
decisions, or seeking governmental accountability. The government’s decision to regulate by incorporating expensive,
difficult-to-locate standards also sends a damaging message
to the public that may feed public cynicism regarding the
openness and accountability of government.
Incorporating standards into law that are generally available only after paying a significant fee set by a private entity
or traveling to Washington, D.C., contrasts starkly with
the strong American tradition, since at least 1795, of widespread public access to the law. This tradition includes, for
example, the use of depository libraries starting in the mid1800s and the passage of the Federal Register Act of 1935,
the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments
of 1996, and the e-Government Act of 2002.50
When private organizations largely control access to
the law, including the apparent power to curtail access to
the text, this category of law, unlike federal statutes, other
federal regulations, and federal court opinions, does not
appear to be under public control. Even if only some citizens are effectively prevented from reading IBR standards,
agencies are expressing a view fundamentally inconsistent
with the strong Congressional policy of open access to the
law. Limited access to IBR rules also undermines the First
Amendment’s core value of free discussion of governmental
affairs.51 This value undergirds the “right of the people to
choose” governmental officials, directly or indirectly, in the
electoral process.52

III. Permissible Reform Measures
Given a fuller understanding of the reasons why law must
be readily available to the public, reform of IBR standards
is required. Any further legislative or administrative
action on agency use of incorporated private standards
should ensure permanent, widespread public availability
of those standards. At a minimum, full access is needed
50. E.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1859, ch. 22, §10, 11 Stat. 379, 381; Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
§4(7), 110 Stat. 3048, 3049; E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107347, §§206(a)-(d), 207(f ), 116 Stat. 2899, 2915-16, 2918-19 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §3501 (2006) note (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services)).
51. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011).
52. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941).
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to ensure that all interested parties, including both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries, have appropriate notice of their legal liabilities and entitlements. Any
reform should provide citizens with assured access during
the entire period the SDO rule has been incorporated
into federal regulatory law. That access ought to be provided in a centralized location that is easy for individuals
to find. Such centralized access must be freely available through governmental depository libraries. Library
access to hard copies could be provided, although it
seems likely that most members of the public now rely on
digital access.53 Ideally, reform would provide access to
IBR rules through text or direct links on the Government
Printing Office and Federal Register websites, and additionally through federal agency websites.54 Access should
be through federally controlled websites to address a second critical barrier to public access—the enormous difficulty of locating IBR standards currently strewn over
many different SDO websites.
Full digital access without charge, beyond what is available at governmental depository libraries, would place
access to IBR standards on the same footing as other federal regulations. The current read-only access to these standards occasionally provided at the option of and only upon
conditions set by SDOs is insufficient.
Nor is the OFR’s regulatory approach adequate. OFR
has missed an opportunity to speak directly to the level
of public access required before language can be incorporated by reference into federal agency rules without Federal Register publication. A federal agency finalizing a rule
must now “[d]iscuss” the way the agency “worked to make
the materials . . . reasonably available,” but this modest
requirement for an agency statement contemplates OFR
approval of agency use of an IBR rule that is not, in fact,
“reasonably available.”55
An agency might have a number of options to ensure
meaningful access to private IBR standards, other than
permitting the SDO to set access charges.56 For example,
an agency could negotiate a license with an SDO to make
IBR standards readily available to the public through a link
on the Federal Register or CFR website. While this public
availability may result in some revenue losses for SDOs,
federal agency incorporation also can increase the demand
for books of SDO standards. No-longer-current versions
of SDO standards are sometimes priced higher than current versions simply because a federal agency has elected
to incorporate the older one by reference.57 Particularly in
groups where regulated entities are well represented, the
strong interest in influencing the content of the law may
even motivate an SDO to agree to online public access
53. Comment of Michael Herz, Sec. Chair, Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, Am. Bar Ass’n 11 (OFR Docket June 1, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481025ea
5&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
54. Bremer, supra note 5, at 179.
55. Incorporation by Reference, 78 Fed. Reg. 60784, 60797 (revision to 1
C.F.R. §51.5(a)(1), proposed Oct. 2, 2013).
56. E.g., Cunningham, supra note 44, at 338-41.
57. E.g., Strauss, supra note 19, at 509-10.
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without further charge.58 The fact that several SDOs have
elected to make IBR standards available on a read-only
basis on their own websites following the initiation of the
OFR rulemaking supports the conclusion that agency
negotiation of a price for incorporated standards may not
be tremendously difficult or expensive.
In the case of an SDO that regularly supplies governmental standards, such as the National Fire Protection
Association or the API, governmental contracting may also
be an option. Besides resolving in favor of the government
the question of who owns the copyright to material that
ends up in federal rules,59 contracting would also permit
the agency to solicit bids to supply standards, thus increasing competition among groups to do so and enabling the
agency to specify more open and accessible processes for
standards development.60 For an SDO who is unwilling to
sign such a contract or to negotiate to provide public access
as a condition of incorporation, a federal agency intent on
incorporating a publicly accessible standard would face a
choice between drafting a government-unique standard or
using compulsory licensing provisions.61
What should be out of bounds? Any proposal that continues to rely primarily on SDOs for public access, so that
the SDOs can condition access on the payment of fees or
revoke it altogether.62 Reforms must assure that groups currently underrepresented in agency and SDO processes have
access to the text of these rules—and thus have a chance
at participating in standards development and at invoking
mechanisms of accountability. The best approach would
be a straightforward one that provides free, easy-to-locate
online access to the entire public.63
Any charge, even a small fee, could obstruct access to
the poor or those who seek access to multiple standards,
and it would still communicate a message of hostility to
core democratic values. These standards should be publicly
available in the same manner as other federal regulatory
standards—for free in governmental depository libraries
and, ideally, through the Government Printing Office and
agency websites as well.

IV.

Conclusion: On Public Access

These over 9,000 IBR rules, covering areas ranging from
infant seat safety to pipeline operation, are published ad
hoc in numerous locations and are hard to locate, even
when federal agencies provide SDO contact information in the CFR. Of even greater concern, public access
to these standards is primarily through private organiza58. See Comment of R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President of Gov’t Affairs,
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. 1 (OFR Docket Apr. 3, 2012), available
at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480feb7
94&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
59. See Rights in Data—General, 48 C.F.R. §52.227-14(b) (2012).
60. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 544-45.
61. See Cunningham, supra note 44, at 332.
62. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 5, at 180-82.
63. Comment of Ronald E. Jarnagin, President, ASHRAE 4 (OFR Docket Mar.
30, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectI
d=0900006480fe4f56&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
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tions empowered to charge significant fees and, effectively,
to revoke access. With IBR rules, the public’s access is
impaired disproportionately based on income.
Access must be generally available to both regulated
entities and the intended beneficiaries of legislation. If
those burdened with obligations cannot learn their substance without paying hundreds of dollars to an SDO or
traveling to Washington, D.C., the law is not meaningfully public.
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Federal regulatory actions apply to the entire public—
broadly and for an indefinite duration. These legislative
or quasi-legislative actions are among the most significant
powers exercised by the federal government. Access to the
text of these rules cannot just be a formality; the text must
be readily, meaningfully available to the public, including
substantial levels of public access without charge. Increased
transparency in the form of meaningful public access is the
bare minimum for accountability.
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